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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and others. 10 All authorities agree that a statute is void which
authorizes a final adjudication of insanity and commitment, without
making some provision by which the person himself be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard.'
J. E. P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT DOCTRINE-
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL VALIDITY OF DIvORCEs.-The respondent, Ernest
Davis, and his first wife were married and domiciled in New York.
Several years afterwards, he obtained a divorce in Nevada upon
grounds of extreme cruelty, without having personally served his
spouse. The very day that the decree was granted, he married the
deceased, Anna Holmes, and returned with her to New York. His
first wife then sued for and subsequently obtained in New York, a
divorce on the ground of Davis' adultery with the deceased, New
York not recognizing the Nevada divorce because its court lacked
personal jurisdiction.' The appellant relied upon the New York decree
to prove that the respondent had never been legally married to her
sister, the deceased, because they never remarried after the New
York decree was granted, and therefore were not husband and wife,
but merely two persons living together. As such, Davis would not
be entitled to the letters of administration of the Holmes estate. The
lower court reversed the order of the Niagara County Surrogate,
denying the letters of administration to the respondent. Held,
affirmed. In view of the most recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Williams and Hendrix v. North Carolina,2 the
court gave full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce,3 declaring
that the finding of the New York court was not binding in this pro-
ceeding, and stating broadly that the decree of a sister state is not
open to collateral attack by a third party. In re Holnes Estate,
291 N. Y. 261, 52 N. E. (2d) 424 (1943).
10 State of Minn. ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,
309 U. S. 270, 60 Sup. Ct. 523, 84 L. ed. 744 (1940); Maxwell v. Maxwell,
189 Iowa 7, 177 N. W. 541 (1920).
11 Barry v. Hall, 98 F. (2d) 222, 68 App. D. C. 350 (App. D. C. 1938);
Ussery v. Haynes, 344 Mo. 530, 127 S. W. (2d) 410 (1939); Ex parte Allen,
82 Vt. 365, 73 AtI. 1078, 26 L. R. A. (N.s.) 232 (1909).
'Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 226 N. E. 508 (1920); McGown v.
McGown, 164 N. Y. 558, 58 N. E. 1089 (1900) ; Matter of Kimball, 155 N. Y.
62 (1898); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30 (1871); Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y.
272 (1869); Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424 (N. Y. 1806). In these cases,
judgments of divorce procured by constructive service were held invalid.
2317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 279 (1942). Petitioners were married to, and
domiciled with, their respective spouses in North Carolina. Together they left
for Nevada, where, after fulfilling the forty-two day residence reqhirement,
they obtained divorces on the ground of cruelty, having served their spouses by
publication and substituted service only. They were then married, returned to
North Carolina, and proceeded to set up housekeeping. The authorities of
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RECENT DECISIONS
When the conclusions of the Williams case were made public,
legal scholars and learned jurists predicted a wave of widespread
criticism and change in the rulings by the various state courts.4 The
effect of this Supreme Court ruling has in many ways proved to be
revolutionary, perhaps not so much as to its text, as to its dicta. 5
As can be seen in the case before us, New York has for the first
time in its history, unconditionally given full faith and credit to a
Nevada decree.6 Citing copiously from the Williams case, the major-
ity opinion paves the way towards a moie lax divorce law. Today
a party, by going to Nevada and fulfilling its statutory residence
requirement, may within six weeks become absolutely divorced with-
out having served his spouse personally. The old doctrine of the
New York courts designed to protect the stay-at-home spouse from
an ex parte migratory divorce, has now been overruled completely.
7
In reliance on the Williams ruling, the court disposed of the question
of bona fide residence as a pre-requisite for jurisdiction of the parties,
stating that it is necessary to assume that the respondent had a
bona fide residence in Nevada, and not that the Nevada domicile
was a sham.8 The court added that the question will continue to
be an open one until the United States Supreme Court makes a
positive statement as to whether a conclusion of a bona fide domicile
by the court of one state can be declared invalid in a court of a
sister state.0 Furthermore, it held that' in this instance, it must, as
in many cases before this, assume the existence of the presumption,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and so deem that the court
of the other state had jurisdiction to render the judgment, though
doubtless the judgment's validity could be impeached by extrinsic
North Carolina arrested them on the charge of bigamy. They pleaded the
Nevada decree and asked that it be given full faith and credit, which the
North Carolina court refused. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the decision of the state court was reversed.
3 U. S. CoxsT. Art. IV, § 1 provides that "full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state." In Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 83 L. ed. 26 (1938),
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 78 L. ed. 1219 (1933), and Atherton v.
Athertf, 181 U. S. 155, 45 L. ed. 794 (1901), courts held that a state is
obliged to give full faith and credit to a foreign decree in the absence of fraud.
4 Tapley, Is "Full Faith" Divorced from Divorces (1943) 17 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 97. See Conway, J., dissenting in the principal case.
5Williams v. North Carolina, cited supra note 2.
6 See note 1 supra. Even after the Williams decision, Matter of Bingham's
Estate, 265 App. Div. 463, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 180 (1943), held invalid Nevada
divorce obtained by constructive service.
7 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. ed. 867 (1906). In an action
for separation in New York, the defense of a previous divorce obtained in
Connecticut was invalid where the wife was served by constructive notice only.
The Supreme Court upheld the New York view that an action for divorce was
one between the parties, and that personal service upon a New York resident
is necessary to obtain jurisdiction over him.
s See note 5 supra.
9 See principal case at 268.
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evidence. 10 It refused to recognize a third party's right to set up
such evidence, 1 yet the dissenting opinion makes it clear that New
York has previously sustained such attack by persons who were not
directly connected with the action.' 2 It is believed that this contro-
versial subject will continue to be the basis of much court litigation.
No sooner had the Court of Appeals rendered its opinion when, in
a lower court in New York State, a similar problem arose. The
lower court refused to follow this decision but preferred to abide
by the old weight of authority, declaring that the Nevada decree was
invalid upon the contention that the domicile established was not
bona fide and that therefore it was never within the jurisdiction of
Nevada to hand down such a decree.' 3
J. P.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MURDER-REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT BE-
CAUSE OF COURT'S STATEMENT THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED.-Defen-
dants Munford, Jackson and Greene were convicted of murder in the
first degree. The jury found that the former inflicted the fatal stab
and that the latter two were fellow conspirators. The crime was
the result of an argument over certain gambling activities which
occurred at the victim's gambling house. Munford, in the company
of Jackson and Greene, arrived at the deceased's apartment and within
a short while, a quarrel ensued. The victim, Eason, rushed from the
room and fled a few blocks with the three defendants following him.
H-ere there was conflicting testimony as to whether the stab was
already inflicted when the deceased left, or whether the crime was
actually consummated at a distant spot after the three defendants
had conspired to kill him. Thus, whether there was a conspiracy,
became one of the most important questions of fact which the jury
had to determine. Upon this point the testimony of the prosecu-
tion's witness, Bey, was vital. After repeatedly denying that he
recognized the three defendants, positively identified them as three
men whom he had seen leave the victim's apartment and pursue him.
When asked to repeat any conversation he had overheard, defendants
objected unless he could name the specific defendant who had spoken.
The court overruled this objection "on the ground there is a con-
tinuing conspiracy at that particular time." The prosecution, relying
on circumstantial evidence, tried to show that the crime was com-
10 Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933); Matter of
Kimball, 155 N. Y. 62, 49 N. E. 331 (1898); Cross v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 628,
15 N. E. 333 (1888).
11 The validity of a judgment could not be challenged after it became final
and the issue decided therein could not be litigated again between the parties
to the action or their privies. See Chicot County Drainage District v. Boston
State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 84 L. ed. 329 (1939).
12 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 47 L. ed. 366 (1902). The decree
was attacked bOy the second wife, a third party.
13 Ammermuller v. Ammermuller, 181 Misc. 98 (1943), decided by Supreme
Court, Special Term, N. Y. County, Dec. 13, 1943.
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